Joint Strike Fighter: Unproven after $300 billion, 7 years

Republicans and Democrats might spar with each other over the effectiveness of the surge in Iraq, whether or not to allocate more troops to Afghanistan and how to approach relations with Iran.

But politicians of every stripe and defense experts all agree that America's aerial superiority is the key to responding to emerging security threats.

Whether we are launching strikes against more traditional armies in Bosnia or eliminating particular terrorist bunkers in Iraq, our tactical strike capabilities are the linchpin of American military dominance and security.

In 2001, the Defense Department unveiled its multi-role, multi-service Joint Strike Fighter (JSF or F-35) program that would presumably sustain amphibious and land attack forces with all-weather strike sorties, close air support, air defense suppression and other offensive missions.

But future U.S. air superiority may crash into the debris of this bloated government project that remains unproven seven years and almost $300 billion later.

Consider the latest report on the JSF issued by the Government Accountability Office, the investigative agency of Congress, in March.

GAO analysts noted extensive delays in the assembly of the first F-35 development aircraft, citing flawed engineering blueprints, multiple design changes, critical parts shortages and manufacturing roadblocks.

Why should the taxpayers continue to subsidize this lumbering failure?

Full deployment of the JSF therefore remains a distant and doubtful hope. The Army and the Navy, for example, have yet to build their F-35 prototypes, leaving open unprecedented questions about cost, design variations, adapting different technologies to the same basic airframe, and the management of one, two or three production lines.

The F-35 will also demand a staggering $240 billion over the next 20 years as other defense accounts grow to meet wartime requirements in two theaters, expand international counter-terrorism operations, curb weapons proliferation and ensure the freedom of the seas while staying prepared for unanticipated contingencies such as a conflict in Eastern Asia or a humanitarian disaster.

What happened? In the case of the JSF, the real question is "what did not happen?"

First, program managers selected a flawed acquisition plan. The GAO's JSF report from 2006 concluded that the strategy for large F-35 purchases before the end of a multi-year testing schedule, known as "fly before you buy," would delay the "delivery of critical capabilities to the warfighter" because the Air Force could not possibly certify the capabilities or safety of the aircraft.

Speaking of safety, on Jan. 18, an independent newsletter, Inside the Air Force, reported that the Pentagon's chief testing official urgently recommended the restoration of three of four JSF airframe safety features mysteriously canceled by the program's prime contractor.

Otherwise, he warned that the F-35 would run the risk of "catastrophic failures."

America's brave airmen must be baffled; we recruit them to risk their lives against our enemies, not a fifth-rate cockpit.

Highly capable, lower-cost alternatives, such as the Navy's F/A-18 Super Hornet or the FA-22 fighter now in production, exist to the F-35. They can put a stop to the cascade of JSF cost overruns, now 38 percent higher per plane since the beginning of the program, and technical shortfalls.

Congress this year should hold public hearings on the tragic saga of the F-35 and clearly warn the Defense Department that it will cut or even cancel the program if this fool's errand of cost overruns and performance shortfalls continues to mug the taxpayers.

Only then will we gain a fleet of proven, affordable tactical fighters to provide the air support needed by all American combat units on the unpredictable battlefields of our time.